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1 Introduction
Managers often use accounting discretion to prot from insider trades. Numerous analytical
studies (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Bushman and Indjejikian, 1995; Huddart, Hughes, and Levine,
2001; etc.) demonstrate disclosure strategies adopted by the managers to increase insider trading
gains. Empirical evidence conrms that managers use nonpublic information or biased disclosures
for higher insider trading prots (Penman, 1982; Elliott, Morse and Richardson, 1984; Rogers and
Stocken, 2005; Rogers, 2008; Jagolinzer, 2009; etc.). In this study, we show that managers could
also obtain insider trading benets by manipulating real operating activities, which has not been
examined by prior research.
The "insiders" in the context of insider trading are often directors, o¢ cers, or other key employees
of the rms. In addition to access to the rmsprivate information, these corporate insiders typically
have control over the rmsoperations. Therefore, they have the opportunity to use the rmsreal
activities to benet themselves.1 In this paper, we examine how managers could exploit operating
decisions to maximize their private benets from insider trading. Specically, we focus on the
interaction of managers production decisions and stock trading decisions, as well as the role of
information in this joint decision process.
We rst consider an insider who is the manager of a monopolistic rm that faces a product
market with uncertain demand. The manager learns an imperfect accounting signal about the
market demand, before he chooses the production output quantity for the rm. Subsequently, the
manager has the opportunity to trade in the rms securities for private benets in a Kyle setting.
We nd allowing the manager to trade in the rms securities creates incentives for the manager to
increase production quantity to a level strictly higher than optimal absent insider trading.
This is because the managers expected insider trading gain is a function of the volatility of
the rms prot. A more volatile rm prot implies more informational asymmetry in the nancial
market, as well as a higher insider trading gain the manager can obtain. In our model, a higher
production quantity amplies the variance of the rms future prot, thus leading to more private
benets for the manager, but at the expense of rm value. Since we assume the manager also has an
equity stake in the rm value, he must trade o¤ the loss of value in the rm and his personal gain
from insider trading when choosing the production quantity.
This result is largely consistent with the conventional wisdom that insider trading is detrimental
to rm value. However, the e¤ect of the upwardly distorted production quantity on social welfare
may be quite di¤erent  as higher production output often leads to increased consumer surplus.
From a regulatory perspective, this benet should be balanced against the well-understood costs of
information asymmetry in the capital markets on market liquidity.
We then extend the monopoly setting to a duopoly setting by letting two rms compete in a
Cournot market. In addition, we allow the managers to trade 1) only in their own rmsstocks, or 2)
in both their own and rival rmsstocks. Again, we nd that the equilibrium production quantities
1 In fact, research shows that managers often use real activities opportunistically in many other settings, such as to
avoid reporting loss (Roydhowdhury, 2006) or to meet earnings benchmarks (Gunny, 2010).
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are upwardly distorted from the prot-maximizing levels in both cases, with greater distortions in
the rst case. This is because in the second case, more insiders in the nancial market compete
the ex-ante expected insider trading gains away, which in turn reduces the managersincentives to
distort production quantities. Clearly, less deviation from optimality leads to higher rm prot and
rm value. However, lower production output could also imply lower consumer surplus.
An interesting third scenario we explore is when the managers only trade in their rival rms
stocks. This could happen when the managers are forbidden from trading their own rmssecurities.
In legal terms, this trading mechanism is a type of "substitutes for insider trading", which describes
when a manager trades in the stocks of a rm whose realized value is correlated with his own
rms (Ayres and Bankman, 2001; Huang, 2006). In our setting of substitute trading, the managers
essentially become complete insiders of their rival rms, while not being able to control the rival
rmsoperations. Thus they do not distort production quantities of their own rms, but can enjoy
benets from insider trading. As long as no collusion is allowed between the two rival rms, substitute
trading does not impair rm value.
When performing comparative statics, we see that the production quantity distortion and ex-
pected insider trading gain decrease in the managers current equity stake in the rm, while the
expected rm value increases in the stake. This is intuitive because the managers incentive is more
aligned with the shareholders when his stake in the rm is high.2 The precision of the rms account-
ing signal is also important. The more accurate the signal, the lower the expected trading prot for
the manager, and the less pronounced the incentive for the manager to distort production quantities.
Thus, the precision of information is positively related to the expected nal rm value. This result
is largely consistent with empirical evidence provided by prior studies such as Welker (1995), Lang
and Lundholm (1996), Botosan (1997), Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999), and Leuz and Verrecchia
(2000).
Finally, we explore the possibility of endogenizing the managers interest in the rm value, per-
haps through a contract when the manager is hired. Baiman and Verrecchia (1995, 1996) consider
principal-agent settings where the principal o¤ers a linear contract to the agent extracting the agents
anticipated prots from subsequent insider trading. That is, the insider trading prots are expected
to be part of the managers implicit compensation, making it cheaper to hire and retain managers.
Following this setting, we allow the managers to be granted a linear contract with a xed pay and a
portion of restricted stock of the rm, in addition to the expected insider trading gain he will later
obtain. To keep the setting simple, we still assume the managers are risk neutral. It turns out the
optimal portion of stock granted results from a trade-o¤ between the rm value that increases in
the managers portion of stock, and the insider trading gain that decreases in it. There is indeed
an interior solution for the optimal stock granted in the contract in the monopoly setting. However,
only a corner solution exists in the duopoly setting involving selling the whole rm to the manager,
because the increase in rm value dominates the decrease in the insider trading gain within the
reasonable range of [0; 1].
2Please note that the e¤ects of the managers stake hold true in all scenarios of the model except with subtitute
trading, in which case the managers stake doesnt matter.
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We contribute to the extant literature in three ways. First, we are the rst to examine the e¤ect of
insider trading on managersmanipulation of real activities. While prior research focuses on managers
using their informational advantages and/or disclosure strategies to increase personal trading gains,
our results imply that managers can also exploit their control over their rmsoperations for the
same purpose. Further, we demonstrate the managers actions a¤ect not only his own rm, but also
the consumers and society at large.
Second, our results shed light on the interaction between nancial markets and product markets.
We nd that the competition among insiders in the nancial market drives down their informational
advantage, a nding similar to that of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992). Further, we nd that
competition in the nancial market in turn dampens the competition in the product market, which
implies an implicit substitutability of these two markets. Thus, policy-makers should take into
consideration the potential e¤ect on one market while regulating the other.
Third, our modelling design circumvents the violation of normality assumption that often occurs
when nancial market models are combined with production decisions.3 Specically, since the rm
value is a function of the squared term of the production output quantity, it may lose its normal
distribution if the uncertainty is contained in the quantity. We maintain the normality assumption
by only letting the manager observe the realized market demand after his production decision. This
ensures that the production quantity is always a constant in equilibrium and the nal rm value as
a function of the quantity is well behaved.4
Our results are readily testable with empirical data. We predict that a rm whose CEO has stock
ownership is less likely to engage in real activities manipulation, i.e., overproduction. However, the
degree of competition within the industry in which the rm operates could mitigate the overproduc-
tion problem. The more competitive the industry, the less likely the participating rms overproduce,
holding the CEOsstock ownership equal. The precision of accounting information should also be
inversely related to the executivesmanipulation of real activities.
Please note although we comment on the welfare e¤ects of insider trading, we do not intend to
evaluate its legality in this paper. The political and academic discussion surrounding insider trading
is long-standing.5 Under U.S. law, insider trading can be legal or illegal. While corporate insiders can
trade their rmsstocks legally in compliance with government regulations and their rmspolicies,
the SEC refers to illegal insider trading as "buying or selling a security, in breach of a duciary duty
3See Bagnoli et al. (2001) and Noeldeke and Troeger (2001) for the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the
existence of a linear equilibrium in the Kyle model.
4This is of course not the only way to maintain the normality of rm value. When facing similar technical issues,
Jain and Mirman (2000, 2002) introduce uncertainty as a multiplicative term of the demand function. The drawback
of their approach is that the second order condition is not always satised.
5For example, Manove (1989) shows that insider trading discourages investment and reduces e¢ ciency. Ausubel
(1990) and Fishman and Hagerty (1992) show that insider trading decreases the informativeness of a rms stock price.
Glosten (1989) and Leland (1992) show that insider trading decreases the rms market liquidity. On the other hand,
Manne (1966) argues that insider trading helps reduce agency problems by aligning the interests of the shareholders and
managers of a rm. Bernhardt, Hollield, and Hughson (1995) nd that insider trading expedites the dissemination of
private information and the price discovery process. Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) show that insider trading could
improve risk-sharing among noise traders with stochastic liquidity needs. Laux (2010) demonstrates that investment
decisions, specically related to the abandonment of projects, can be improved when managers are allowed to time
their trading activities based on insider information.
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or other relationship of trust and condence, while in possession of material, nonpublic information
about the security."6 Previous studies on insider trading in nance, law, and economics often focus on
whether insider trading should be allowed. In this paper, however, we intend to examine the "real"
e¤ects of insider trading - how insider trading opportunities a¤ect the preceding operating decisions
made by rm managers.
Our study is related to prior research on nancial market information and real activities. Gao and
Liang (2013) evaluate a rms optimal disclosure policy for the secondary stock market and associated
e¤ects on real investment decisions. The traders in the secondary market possess privately-acquired
information about the rm, which is reected in stock price through trading, and "fed back" into the
rms real investment decisions. Accounting disclosure reduces the informational asymmetry between
the insiders and noise traders, but may also lead to a less informative stock price and decreased
investment e¢ ciency. Gao and Liang (2013) focus on the "feedback" e¤ect on a rms investment
decision of the investorsprivate information impounded in the stock price. The investors in our
study, however, do not have any private information and merely serve as liquidity traders.
Several prior studies also examine insider trading and accounting disclosure in various settings.
Kim and Verrecchia (1994) nd accounting disclosures could actually lead to increased information
asymmetry and less liquidity in a Kyle setting. Bushman and Indjejikian (1995) also show that
disclosure of private information can actually increase the managers personal gain from insider
trading by crowding out other informed traders from the nancial market. Huddart et al. (2001)
examine the case when insiders must publicly disclose their trades after these trades are completed.
As a result, the insiders adopt a dissimulation strategy by adding noise in their orders. None of these
studies explicitly consider operating decisions or product market competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model in a single-
rm setting. Sections 3 extends the analyses to a two-rm setting. Section 4 further discusses the
possibility of contracting. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The basic model
In the basic model, we consider a monopolistic rm that produces and sells a product to con-
sumers. It faces a linear inverse demand function p = ea  q, where p is the unit price for its product;ea is the intercept of market demand; and q is the output quantity. The market demand is uncertain,
with ea  N (ma;a), and is only realized after the production quantity decision has been made.7
Without loss of generality, we assume the rms marginal cost is 0.
The rm is run by a risk-neutral manager, who is responsible for the rms operations. At
the beginning of the game, the manager receives a noisy interim signal es, generated by the rms
6See http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm for more details.
7A normally distributed ea, although a common assumption (e.g. Darrough, 1993; Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997),
opens up the possibility of negative production quantities in equilibrium. We assume ma is su¢ ciently large that the
possibility of negative production is small. Further, negative production can be understood as converting the products
back into its original cost components under a reversible production technology. See Christensen and Feltham (2005)
for a brief review on this topic.
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accounting system. For convenience, we dene the accounting information in the model as a signal
about the market demand ea.8 The signal equals es = ea + e, with e  N (0;) : The precision of
the signal, 1 ; represents the accuracy of accounting information. After receiving the signal es, the
manager discloses it publicly.9
The manager has a subsequent opportunity to trade in the rms shares. Following Kyle (1985),
we consider three types of participants in the stock market. The rst type is a risk-neutral competitive
market maker, who sets the pricing rule and makes zero trading prots. The second type is the noise
traders who, for exogenous reasons such as liquidity needs, trade randomly. The third type is the
insider-manager who makes the quantity decision for his rm before observing the nal market
demand ea = a. The demand submitted by the manager is denoted ed, and the demand of the noisy
trader is denoted eu  N (0;u). The market maker observes the combined total order ow eD = ed+eu,
but cannot distinguish d or u separately. She then sets the market clearing price for the rms stock,
P:
To introduce tension into the model, we presume that the manager also has some interest in the
rms nal prot, V . Perhaps he is concerned with his own job prospect, hence the rms long-term
survival. Or, he may own a certain amount of restricted stock that he was granted at a prior date. In
either case, we assume the managers stake in the rm value is 0 < !  1.10 That is, in addition to
the expected insider trading gains, the manager also cares about !V: Thus, he chooses the production
quantity to maximize the sum of  and !V; his expected insider trading gains and his equity stake
in the rm, respectively. In the basic model, we assume away any other compensation the manager
may get from the rm.
The timeline of the events is as follows.
1. The rms accounting system produces a noisy signal es, which the manager learns and discloses
publicly.
2. The manager makes production quantity decision q.
3. The market demand a is realized, as well as the nal rm value V; both privately observed by
the manager.
4. The manager submits his order d, while the noisy trader submits u, to the market maker to
trade shares.
5. The market maker receives a total order ow D and executes the trades.
In summary, the scenario described is a two-stage game involving production quantity decision
followed by a Kyle (1985) model. The solution concept we use is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
8 In reality, the interim accounting signal can also be about the rms cost or prot. Whether the signal is about
demand, cost or prot does not matter in the analyses, since their e¤ects on the nal rm value are qualitatively
equivalent.
9We assume the manager always publicly discloses the signal es. This ensures that the probability distribution of
the nal rm value is common knowledge for all market participants, which is assumed in the Kyle setting, as well as
most of the nancial market models.
10 In a later discussion, we explore the possibility of an endogenous !.
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derived through backward induction. The manager in our setting has two decision variables: the
rms production quantity and his own trading decision in the rms shares. The market makers
problem is to set price for the rms stocks. We focus on linear strategies of the players, and evaluate
the impact of subsequent insider trading on the rms operating decisions.
2.1 When insider trading is not allowed
We rst analyze the managers strategy absent insider trading. When he receives a signales = ea + e and discloses it to the public, the belief of the market demand is updated to (ajs) 
N

as+ma
a+
; aa+

: If insider trading is impossible, the manager would simply maximize his
stake in the expected rm value. His objective function is
max
q
! (q(E [ajs]  q)) : (1)
The optimal production quantity chosen by the manager is
q =
1
2
E [ajs] = 1
2
as+ ma
a + 
:
Since the market demand is uncertain, the rm value is thus
eV (s;ea) = 1
2
q (ea  q) :
It is easy to see that the rm value is normally distributed, with q a¤ecting both the mean and the
variance of the rm value, eV  N 14 as+maa+ 2 ; 14 as+maa+ 2 aa+

.
2.2 When insider trading is allowed
Next we examine the scenario when insider trading is allowed. After learning the accounting
signal es, the manager chooses production quantity bq at time 2 so as to maximize his total payo¤,
which is the sum of his equity stake in the rm and his expected insider trading gains
E
h
!eV (bq)i+ E [ (bq)] : (2)
Given bq, the rm value is eV  N bq (E [ajs]  bq) ; bq2 aa+ : The manager then observes the realized
market demand ea = a; or eV = V at time 3. He and the noise traders both submit their demands, d
and u, respectively, for the rm shares to the market maker at time 4. The manager does not observe
the noise tradersdemand eu: He chooses his demand d so as to maximize his personal trading prot
E
h
(V   P (D)) djeV = V i : (3)
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Finally, at time 5, the total order ow received by the market maker is eD = ed + eu: She sets the
market clearing price by setting
P (D) = E [V jD = d+ u] : (4)
As is standard in the Kyle model, we focus on linear strategies of the players. That is, the manager
uses a linear strategy in determining his demand by setting
d (V ) = + V; (5)
and the market maker uses a linear pricing rule
P (d+ u) = +  (d+ u) : (6)
We derive the managers equilibrium production quantity using backward induction. That is, we
rst solve the market makers price-setting strategy and the managers demand order strategy, so
that we could compute the managers ex-ante expected insider trading gains E [] for any given bq.
We then plug E [ (bq)] and E [V (bq)] into the managers objective function and solve for bq.
Proposition 1. In a monopoly product market with subsequent insider trading, there exists a unique
linear equilibrium characterizing the strategies of the manager and the market maker as follows:
 =  
p
ur
a
a+
(E [ajs]  bq) ;  = pubqr a
a+
;
 = bq (E [ajs]  bq) ;  = bq
2
p
u
q
a
a+
;
and bq = 1
2
(E [ajs]) + 1
4!
r
ua
a + 
:
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 presents a result similar to that of a one-period Kyle model, but incorporating a
real production decision by the manager. Allowing insider trading distorts the managers incentive
when making the quantity decision for his rm. Since the mean and the variance of the nal rm
value are both functions of bq, the quantity decision a¤ects the managers subsequent trading decision,
as well as the market makers pricing strategy.
When insider trading is banned, the production quantity is q = 12 (E [ajs]) :When insider trading
is allowed, the production quantity is bq = q+ 14!quaa+ : Production quantity is thus always higher
when insider trading is allowed. This result occurs because the managers ex-ante trading prots,
E [] = bq2
q
ua
a+
; are increasing in bq. The manager thus has incentives to increase the production
quantity beyond the prot-maximizing level. Further, bq converges to q as ! increases, since the
managers incentive to distort production decreases.
One implication of Proposition 1 is the potentially improved consumer welfare as a result of
insider trading. When the manager of the monopolistic rm has the opportunity to trade as an
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insider, the production quantity will be upwardly distorted. The consumers of the real good will
therefore enjoy the lower selling price of the rms products, hence higher consumer surplus.
Corollary 1.1. In a monopoly product market with subsequent insider trading, the managers ex-ante
expected trading prot is
E [] = ma
r
ua
a + 
+
1
2!
ua
a + 
;
which decreases in the managers stake in the rm ! and accounting precision 1 :
Proof. See appendix.
The result presented in Corollary 1.1 is intuitive. The managers ex-ante trading prot is a
function of the variance of the rms value. The higher the rm values variance, the higher the
informational advantage the insider has. Thus, the precision of the accounting signal a¤ects the
managers expected trading prot in a negative way. The more precise the accounting signal is, the
less trading prot the manager can expect.
Corollary 1.2. In a monopoly product market with subsequent insider trading, the ex-ante expected
rm prot is
E
heV i = m2a
4
  1
16!2
ua
a + 
;
which increases in the managers stake in the rm ! and accounting precision 1 :
Proof. See appendix.
When insider trading is impossible, the expected rm prot is 14

E
h
aes+ma
a+
i2
= m
2
a
4 : The
expected rm prot is thus lower when insider trading is allowed. The ex-ante expected rm prot
with insider trading is lower than the monopoly prot due to the distorted quantity decision. Essen-
tially, the manager trades o¤ his current stake in the rm and his personal gain from insider trading
when making the production quantity decision. Thus, the higher the managers current stake in the
rm, the less distortion in his quantity decision, and the higher the rm prot.
We can also see that the expected ex-ante rm prot increases in the accounting precision 1 :
This result occurs because accounting precision reduces the managers ex-ante trading prot and
thus his incentives to distort the quantity decision. A very precise accounting signal would thus
prevent managers from engaging in subsequent insider trading, and hence improve total rm value.
The results of the two corollaries can be illustrated through Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Firm value and insider trading prot as a function
of managers stake and accounting precision.
We can see that the rm value is constant in ! and  when insider trading is not allowed.
However, the introduction of insider trading opens up two sources of ine¢ ciency: the misaligned
managerial interest and the noisy information. The rm value increases with the managers interest
in the rm and the degree of precision of the rms accounting signal. On the contrary, the managers
ex-ante expected insider trading prot decreases with the managers stake and the accounting signal
precision.
3 Two-rm setting
The monopoly case shows how subsequent insider trading could a¤ect a managers operating
decision in a single rm setting. Next we expand the case into a duopoly in which two rms,
denoted as i, j (i, j = 1; 2), compete in a Cournot product market. For convenience, we assume the
two rms/managers are identical and play symmetric strategies in both the nancial and product
markets. Having two rms signicantly a¤ects in both the product market and the nancial market
in our model. In addition to the expected change in product quantity decisions, it also changes the
managersexpected insider trading gain as well as their trading behavior.
The timeline is the same as in the monopoly case. We assume the two rms manufacture the
same product. The two rms shares are both traded in the stock market. The linear inverse
demand function for the product is now p = ea   qi   qj , where qi and qj are the output quantities
produced and sold by each rm, respectively. Further, the two rms face a common market demandea  N (ma;a),11 which is realized after the rms choose their production quantities.
11Our assumption of common market demand simplies the proofs but is not critical. When the two rms have
rm-specic demand information, all the major results remain qualitatively the same. This is because the information
on the market demand is imperfect but unbiased. One signal from each rm about the common demand allows the
rms to update their information twice. However, when the information is about uncorrelated rm-specic demand,
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Each of the two rms is run by a hired manager. The manager i receives a noisy interim accounting
signal esi = ea + ei, i = 1; 2, with e1 and e2 being independent and identically distributed. The
managers then disclose their respective signals to the public before they make production decisions.
Then they observe the nal product market demand ea = a, before trading in the nancial market.
We denote manager is demand for rm is shares as edii, and his demand for rm js shares as edij .
The market maker i observes the total order ow eDi for rm is share, which include the order
submitted by the insiders and the liquidity traders order u. She then sets the market clearing price
for the rm is stock, Pi:
3.1 When insider trading is not allowed
When insider trading is not allowed, the manager of each rm simply maximizes his own stake in
the rm. After the managers disclose their signals s1 and sj , they both get to use the two signals to
update their belief about the market demand to (ajsi; sj)  N

ma+a(si+sj)
2a+
; a2a+

. Manager
is problem is:
max
qi
! (qi(E [ajsi; sj ]  qi   qj)) : (7)
Manager js problem is symmetric. Solving for the production quantity as in a standard Cournot
problem, we have
qi =
1
3
E [ajsi; sj ] = 1
3
ma + a (si + sj)
2a + 
:
By plugging qi and q

j into the rms prot function, we can obtain the corresponding prot for rm
i eVi (si; sj ;ea)  N 19 ma+a(si+sj)2a+ 2 ; 19 ma+a(si+sj)2a+ 2 a2a+

.
3.2 When managers only trade in their own rmsstocks
Now we examine the scenario when insider trading is allowed. We rst consider the case when
each manager trades in his own rms stock only. That is, we let dii = di and dij = 0. In this
case, the two rms compete in a duopolistic product market, but their managers still act as the
monopolistic insiders of their respective stocks in the nancial market. Thus, the second stage of
the game (Kyle model) is similar to that of the monopoly setting, while the rst stage of the game
(Cournot) is di¤erent.
The manager i has two decision variables. First, he chooses production quantity bqi so as to
maximize his total payo¤
E
h
!eVi (bqi)i+ E [i (bqi)] : (8)
Second, he chooses his demand for his rms share, di, so as to maximize his total trading prot
E
h
Vi   ePi  eDi dijeVi = Vii : (9)
one signal each rm will only allow the rms to update their information once, on their own specic demand. Therefore,
the assumption of common market demand only results in more precision than rm-specic demand.
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In the second stage of the game, the market maker determines the market clearing price for rm is
stock by setting
Pi (Di) = E [VijDi = di + u] : (10)
Again, we focus on the playerslinear strategies. Manager is is
di (Vi) = i + iVi; (11)
and the market maker is pricing rule is
Pi (di + u) = i + i (di + u) : (12)
After the rms disclose s1 and sj , all players update their beliefs about the product market
demand to (ajsi; sj)  N

ma+a(si+sj)
2a+
; a2a+

. Plugging bqi and bqj into rm is prot function,
we get eVi  N bqi (E [ajsi; sj ]  bqi   bqj) ; bq2i a2a+ : We then use backward induction to solve for
the managers and the market makers linear strategies, and the equilibrium production quantity.
Proposition 2. In a Cournot product market with subsequent insider trading where the managers
only trade in their own rms shares, there exists a unique linear equilibrium characterizing the
strategies of the manager i and the market maker i; where i; j = 1; 2; as follows:
i =  
p
ur
a
2a+
(E [ajsi; sj ]  bqi   bqj) ; i = pubqir a2a+ ;
i = bqi (E [ajsi; sj ]  bqi   bqj) ; i = bqi2puq a2a+ ;
and bqi = bqj = 1
3
E [ajsi; sj ] + 1
6!
r
ua
2a + 
:
Proof. See appendix.
In comparison with Proposition 1 about a quantity-setting manager in a monopoly, the results
in Proposition 2 reect the change in the nature of the product market structure. Comparing
the managers quantity decisions when insider trading is not possible, qi =
1
3E [ajsi; sj ] ; and the
managersquantity decisions when insider trading is allowed, bqi = qi + 16!qua2a+ ; obviously we
have bqi > qi again.
Similar to the monopoly case, we can expect improved consumer surplus as a result of the
increased production quantities. Thus, the possibility exists that subsequent insider trading also
improves consumer welfare in a duopoly market.
Corollary 2.1. In a Cournot product market and subsequent insider trading where the managers
only trade in their own rmsshares, managers ex-ante trading prot is
E [i] =
ma
6
r
ua
2a + 
+
1
12!
ua
2a + 
;
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which decreases in the managers stake in the rm ! and accounting precision 1 :
Proof. See appendix.
The sum of the two managersexpected trading prot in a Cournot product market is only a 13
of the managers trading prot in a monopoly market, indicating that product market competition
reduces insider trading prots. In a duopoly setting, the accounting precision again reduces the
managers ex-ante trading prot.
Corollary 2.2. In a Cournot product market and subsequent insider trading where the managers
only trade in their own rmsshares, each rms ex-ante expected prot is
E [Vi] =
1
6!
 
2!ma +
r
ua
2a + 
! 
ma  
 
1
3!
 
2!ma +
r
ua
2a + 
!!!
;
which increases in the managers stake in the rm ! and accounting precision 1 :
Proof. See appendix.
Since qi maximizes rm is prot in the Cournot product market, and bqi < qi , we know the
expected rm prot when q = bqi is strictly lower than when q = qi . This can be easily veried by
comparing the prot levels when insider trading is not allowed and when it is allowed. The amount
of prot reduction is however smaller than in the monopoly case, relative to the rm prot, because
the managers expected gain from insider trading in duopoly case achieved through the quantity
distortion is smaller. Further, we show that expected ex-ante rm value in the Cournot setting still
increases in the managers current stake in the rm and the accounting precision, both of which
reduce the managers incentives to distort the rms quantity decision.
3.3 When managers trade in both their competitorsand own rmsstocks
Now we allow the managers to trade in both their rival rmsand own rmsstocks. This new
assumption leads to duopolistic competition of the two managers both in the product market and in
the nancial market. The manager i still chooses production quantity bqi so as to maximize his total
payo¤
E
h
!eVi (bqi)i+ E [i (bqi)] : (13)
He chooses his demand for his own rm is share, dii, so as to maximize his trading prot in rm is
shares
E
h
Vi   ePi  eDi diijeVi = Vii ; (14)
and his demand for rm js share, dij , so as to maximize his trading prot in rm js shares
E
h
E [Vj jVi]  ePj  eDj dij jeVi = Vii : (15)
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The market maker for rm is stock sets the market clearing price by setting
Pi (Di) = E [VijDi = dii + dji + u] : (16)
Manager is linear strategies are
dii (Vi) = ii + iiVi (17)
and
dij (E [Vj jVi]) = ij + ijE [Vj jVi] ; (18)
Lastly, the market maker is linear pricing rule is
Pi (dii + dji + u) = i + i (dii + dji + u) : (19)
The product market demand is updated to (ajsi; sj)  N

ma+a(si+sj)
2a+
; a2a+

after si and
sj are disclosed. Thus, rm is value is eVi  N bqi (E [ajsi; sj ]  bqi   bqj) ; bq2i a2a+ :
Proposition 3. In a Cournot product market with subsequent insider trading where the managers
trade in both their rival rmsand own rmsshares, there exists a unique linear equilibrium char-
acterizing the strategies of the manager i and the market maker i; where i; j = 1; 2; as follows:
ii = ji =  
p
ur
a
2a+
(E [ajsi; sj ]  bqi   bqj) ; ii = ji = 1bqi pur a
2a+
;
i = bqi (E [ajsi; sj ]  bqi   bqj) ; i = bqi3
r
a
2a+p
u
;
and bqi = bqj = 1
3
E [ajsi; sj ] + 1
9!
r
ua
2a + 
:
Proof. See appendix.
Compared to Proposition 2, Proposition 3 reects the change in the playersstrategies as a result
of the change in the nancial market in addition to the change in the product market. We know rm
is production quantity is qi =
1
3E [ajsi; sj ] when insider trading is not allowed. Firm is production
quantity is bqi = qi + 16!qua2a+ when insider trading is allowed and the managers only trade in
their own rmsstocks. Firm is production quantity is bqi = qi + 19!qua2a+ when insider trading is
allowed and the managers trade in both their own and rival rmsstocks. We see that the production
quantity is lowest when insider trading is not allowed, and highest when insider trading is allowed
and the managers only trade in their own rmsstocks.
Corollary 3.1. In a Cournot product market with subsequent insider trading where the managers
trade in both their rival rmsand own rmsshares,the managers ex-ante trading prot is
E [i] =
ma
9
r
ua
2a + 
+
1
27!
ua
2a + 
;
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which decreases in the managers stake in the rm ! and accounting precision 1 :
Proof. See appendix.
Compared to the expected insider trading prot when managers only trade in their own rms
stocks, their trading prots are lower when they can trade in both rms stocks. This result is
consistent with Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) in that competition in the nancial market reduces
insider trading prot. Interestingly, the reduced insider trading prot also reduces the managers
incentive to distort the rms operating decisions. Thus, when managers trade in both their own
and rival rmsstocks, the production quantities are lower, and the expected rm prots are higher,
than when managers only trade in their own rmsstocks.
Corollary 3.2. In a Cournot product market with subsequent insider trading where the managers
trade in both their rival rmsand own rmsshares, the rms earn an ex-ante expected prot
E
heVii = 1
9!
 
3!ma +
r
ua
2a + 
! 
ma  
 
2
9!
 
3!ma +
r
ua
2a + 
!!!
;
which increases in the managers stake in the rm ! and accounting precision 1 :
Proof. See appendix.
Since the production quantity here is higher than the prot-maximizing level qi when insider
trading is forbidden, but lower than when the managers can only trade in their own rmsshares, the
resulting rm prot level must be between the two cases as well. Therefore, there is less deviation
from optimal operating decision when the managers can trade freely in both rms stocks in the
nancial market.
3.4 When managers trade only in the rivals stock (substitute trading)
We also examine a third scenario, in which the managers trade their rival rms shares only.
That is, we let dii = 0. When insiders are forbidden from trading their own rmsshares, they can
engage in "substitutes for insider trading," which involve trading shares of rms that are related with
the rm that the insider has information about (Ayres and Bankman, 2001). For example, instead
of trading his own rms shares, the insider could trade shares of his rms suppliers, customers,
competitors, etc.. In fact, "substitute trading" could happen whenever an insider trades in the
stocks of a rm whose realized value is correlated with his own rms (Huang, 2006).
In our setting, since the two rms are symmetric, the manager of rm i is informationally an
insider of rm j. However, he does not have any control over rm js operations, as long as there
is no collusive agreement between the two rms. Therefore, the insider trading part of the game is
similar to the scenario of manager i trading only rm is shares, but the production part of the game
is di¤erent.
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The manager chooses dij , his demand for rm js share, to maximize his insider trading gain
E
h
E [Vj jVi]  ePj  eDj dij jeVi = Vii : (20)
The market maker chooses Pj , the market clearing price for rm js stock, by setting
Pj (Dj) = E [Vj jDj = dij + u] : (21)
Manager is linear strategy is
dij (E [Vj jVi]) = ij + ijE [Vj jVi] ; (22)
and the market maker js pricing rule is
Pj (dj + u) = j + j (dij + u) : (23)
Proposition 4. In a Cournot product market with subsequent insider trading where the managers
trade only their rival rmsshares, there exists a unique linear equilibrium characterizing the strate-
gies of the manager i and the market maker j; where i; j = 1; 2; as follows:
ij =  
p
ur
a
2a+
(E [ajsi; sj ]  bqi   bqj) ; ij = pubqjr a2a+ ;
j = bqj (E [ajsi; sj ]  bqi   bqj) ; j = bqj2puq a2a+ ;
and bqi = bqj = 1
3
E [ajsi; sj ] :
Proof. See appendix.
Note that the production quantity here is the same as qi , when insider trading is not allowed.
There is no distortion in the rmsoperating decisions and their prots remain at the highest level.
This is because the managers cannot control their rival rmsproduction decisions, and distorting
their own rmsproduction quantities would not a¤ect their expected insider trading gain.
Corollary 4.1. In a Cournot product market with subsequent insider trading where the managers
trade only in their rival rmsshares, the managers ex-ante trading prot is
E [i] =
ma
6
r
ua
2a + 
;
which decreases in the accounting precision 1 , but is not a¤ected the managers stake in the rm
!i. The rms earn an ex-ante expected prot
E
heVii = m2a
9
;
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which is not a¤ected by the managers stake in the rm !i, nor by the accounting precision 1 .
Proof. See appendix.
In the case of substitute trading, the rm prot is the same as when insider trading is not allowed,
while the managers are still able to earn some insider trading benets. The expected ex-ante insider
trading prot is strictly lower than when the managers can only trade in their own rmsstocks.
This is because the managers cannot manipulate production quantities to increase his trading gain.
Further, the insider trading benets E [i] still decreases in the precision of accounting signal 1 ,
but is not a¤ected by his stake in the rm, !i. The rmsexpected prot E
heVii, is a¤ected by
neither 1 nor !i.
We then compare the results of the four di¤erent scenarios, as illustrated in Figure 2.
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Black: without insider trading; Green: trading in own rms stock only;
Red: trading in both rmsstocks; Blue: trading in rivals stock only
Figure 2: Firm value and insider trading prot
in di¤erent insider trading scenarios.
In summary, comparing the expected rm values in the di¤erent insider trading scenarios, we
nd the rm value is lowest when the managers trade in only their own rmsstocks, and highest
when insider trading is not possible or when the manager can only trade in their rivals shares.
The expected ex-ante rm value when insider trading is allowed and the managers trade in both
their own and rival rmsstocks is ranked in the middle. On the other hand, the ex-ante expected
insider trading prot is highest when the manager can only trade in his own rms stocks, since
he can has no competition as an insider in the nancial market, and he can manipulate production
quantity to further increase his personal benets. However, the expected insider trading gains when
the managers can trade in both rmsshares and when they can only trade in their rivalsshares are
less straightforward. When the managers stake in the rm is high, his trading gains are likely to be
higher when he can only trade in the rivals stocks than when he can trade in both rms, because
his incentive to manipulate the operations is lower.
Another observation we make is related to the consumer surplus. Since it unambiguously increases
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in the production output, consumer surplus is the highest when the managers can trade in their own
rmsshares, and lowest when the managers can only trade in their rivalsshares, or when insider
trading is not allowed at all. It is thus important for regulators to consider all the total social welfare
when setting rules on insider trading.
4 Endogenizing managers ownership through contracting
In the previous sections of the paper, we assumed that the managers stake in the rm, !, is
exogenously given. A natural question that may arise is whether ! can be determined through
contracting prior to the managers operating decisions and trading. In the following discussion, we
explore the possibility of ! being endogenous.
4.1 One-rm setting
We rst examine the single-rm setting. Suppose the board of directors of the rm grants the
manager a linear compensation contract of the form S = + !V , with  being the xed salary, and
! being the managers equity stake in the rm value. When granting the compensation contract, the
board aims to maximize the rm value V net of the compensation paid to the manager. Similar to
Baiman and Verrecchia (1995, 1996), we assume the board and the manager himself anticipate that
the manager will engage in insider trading, and his ex-ante expected insider trading gain E [] is
part of his total payo¤. Although E [] is not a formal component of the managers compensation,
both the board and the manager are fully aware of this side benet. We normalize the managers
reservation utility to zero. Both the board and the manager are risk neutral.
At time 0, when the compensation contract is being o¤ered, the board maximizes the expected
rm value net of the managers pay
max
;!
E [V   (+ !V )] ; (24)
subject to the managers individual participation constraint
E [] + + !E [V ]  0: (25)
Given the managers zero reservation utility, the binding participation constraint implies that his
explicit pay and implicit benets through future insider trading together sum up to zero. That is,
  = E [] + !E [V ]. By plugging the participation constraint into the boards objective function,
we have
max
!
E [V ] + E [] : (26)
The rest of the game follows exactly the same time line as the basic model. The manager then
receives a signal about the market demand, and makes the production quantity decision for the
rm, before he trades in the rms shares. We apply the same backward induction to derive the
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optimal !, by rst computing the managers expected insider trading prots a la Kyle (1985), then
the production quantity he chooses to maximize the sum of his insider trading gain and equity stake,
and nally the optimal equity stake the board grants.
Proposition 5. When the board of directors o¤ers a linear contract in the form S =  + !V to
the manager with subsequent insider trading opportunity in a monopoly product market, there is a
unique interior solution for !, the optimal portion of stock granted.
Proof. See appendix.
Observing the boards objective function, we see that it includes two parts: the expected rm
value and the expected insider trading gain for the manager. The expected insider trading gain
here equals the implicit benets the manager obtains from future insider trading. The more benets
the manager can expect from insider trading, the less the board has to pay him through explicit
compensation. Since the expected rm value E [V ] increases in ! and the expected insider trading
gain E [] decreases in !, the board must choose the optimal ! by trading o¤ the improvement in
rm value with more explicit compensation she has to pay the manager.
Figure 3 illustrates how a unique ! can be obtained through a numerical example. We can see
that E [V ] increases in ! and E [] decreases in !. However, because E [V ] increases less than E []
decreases in !, the boards objective function E [V ] +E [] has one unique peak of maximization in
! within the reasonable range of [0; 1].
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rm value; Red: expected insider trading prots;
Black: rm value plus trading prots
Figure 3: Contracting in a single-rm setting.
4.2 Two-rm setting
In the two-rm setting, we rst consider when the managers can only trade in their own rms
stocks. We still assume the two rms are identical and play symmetric strategies. Firm is board
of directors o¤ers their manager a linear compensation contract in the form Si = i + !iVi so as to
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maximize the expected rm value net of the managers pay
max
i;!i
E [Vi   (i + !iVi)] : (27)
Manager is individual rationality constraint is
E [i] + i + !iE [Vi]  0: (28)
Substituting the managers binding participation constraint into the objective function of rm is ,
we have
max
!i
E [Vi] + E [i] : (29)
The rest of the game proceeds the same way as the two-rm setting when the managers only trade
in their own rmsstocks.
Proposition 6. When the board of directors of rm i o¤ers a linear contract in the form Si =
i + !iVi to the manager with subsequent insider trading opportunity in a duopoly product market,
the optimal portion of stock granted is a corner solution with !i = 1.
Proof. See appendix.
Again the board must choose the optimal !i by trading o¤ the increase in rm value with the
decrease in the expected insider trading gain, which equals the implicit benets the manager obtains.
In a two-rm setting, only a corner solution exists for the contract because the increase in rm value
dominates the decrease in insider trading gain within the reasonable range of !. Figure 4 illustrates
the curvature of the boards objective function [V ] + E [] in ! through a numerical example. We
can clearly see that it does not have a peak for the range ! 2 [0; 1].
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Green: rm value; Red: expected insider trading prots;
Black: rm value plus trading prots
Figure 4: Contracting in a two-rm setting.
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The results are qualitatively similar when we consider other trading scenarios such as when managers
can trade in both rmsshares, and when they can trade only in rival rmsshares. Thus, in the two-
rm setting, the best solution for the board is to sell the rm to the manager before the production
and insider trading activities even begin. However, the board may decide to not sell the whole rm
to the manager due to other concerns that are not included in the model. For example, the manager
may be risk averse. Or the rm prot is a function of the managers personal e¤ort. We do not
consider these factors in this study.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we intend to identify and evaluate a previously overlooked consequence of insider
trading: real activities manipulation through purposeful overproduction. Specically, we study in-
sider trading in a setting where the manager of the rm also makes operating decisions in anticipation
of subsequent insider trading opportunities. The e¤ect of operating decisions on the variability of
future rm value is the channel through which operating decisions also inuence subsequent insider
trading.
We nd the production quantity with subsequent insider trading is strictly higher than quantity
absent insider trading, leading to lower expected rm value but potentially higher consumer surplus.
We also nd that the competition among insiders in the nancial market drives down the expected
insider trading prots and results in less distorted production decisions, suggesting a substitute
relation between product market competition and nancial market competition.
Our results have some interesting policy implications. First, allowing insider trading in our
setting hurts shareholder interests, but benets the consumers. Second, the product market and
the nancial market are interrelated. When one market is being regulated, the other market will
be a¤ected as well. For example, restricting some insiders from trading in a rms stock softens
the competition in the nancial market and leads to higher expected insider trading prots, but
intensies the competition in the product market by giving the managers incentive to overproduce.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1:
We use backward induction to nd the solution to the problem.
In the second stage, we know both the manager and the market maker use linear strategies. That
is, d
eV  = +  eV and P ed+ eu = + ed+ eu : The manager determines his demand d for the
rms shares so as to maximize his trading prot E
heV     ed+ eu djeV = V i, which equals
(V     d) d:
Taking the rst order condition w.r.t d and setting it equal to zero, we get d =  2 +
1
2V:
Clearly, d is a linear function of V with  =  2 and  =
1
2 :Based on s; we know that the mar-
ket demand is (ajs)  N

as+ma
a+
; aa+

. The corresponding nal rm value is thus eV 
N
bq (E [ajs]  bq) ; bq2 aa+ : Since eD =  +  eV + eu ; we know eD is normally distributed witheD  N + bq (E [ajs]  bq) ; 2bq2 aa+ + u : The market makers market clearing condition is
p (D) = E
heV j+  eV + ui = +  (d+ u) ; (30)
indicating eD and eV have a var-cov matrix" bq2 aa+ bq2 aa+
bq2 aa+ 2bq2 aa+ + u
#
:
The market maker draws inference from eD and updates her belief about eV by setting  = bq2 aa+
2bq2a+u ;
and  = bq (E [ajs]  bq)  bq2 aa+
2bq2 a
a+
+u
(+ bq (E [ajs]  bq)) : Solving for the unknowns, we have
 =  
p
uq
a
a+
(E [ajs]  bq) ;  = pubqq aa+ ;
 = bq (E [ajs]  bq) ;  = 1
2
bq
u
r
ua
a + 
:
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The price for the rms stock is therefore
p (D) =
1
2
bq (E [ajs]  bq) + (ea  bq) + 1
u
r
ua
a + 
eu! : (31)
The managers demand for the rms stock is
d =  
p
uq
a
a+
(E [ajs]  bq) + puq
a
a+
(ea  bq) : (32)
The managers trading prot is therefore
E
heV   p di = E
24 pu
2bqq aa+ ((bq (ea  bq))  bq (a  bq))
2
35 : (33)
Conditional on not yet knowing ea, the above trading prot is bq2quaa+ :
Now we consider the rst stage of the game, when the manager makes the quantity decision for
the rm. The managers objective function is a combination of trading prots  and rm value V .
The manager maximizes
E [] + ! [V ] = !bq (E [ajs]  bq) + bq
2
r
ua
a + 
(34)
Taking the rst order condition w.r.t. bq and setting it equal to zero, we have bq = 2!E[ajs]+
r
ua
a+
4! :
B Proof of Corollary 1.1:
From the proof of Proposition 1, we know the managers trading prot is
E
heV   P di = E [bq]
2
r
ua
a + 
= E

aes+ ma
a + 
r
ua
a + 
+
1
2!
ua
a + 
: (35)
Since the E [es] = ma; we know the E haes+maa+ i = ma: Thus the above simplies to E [] =
ma
q
ua
a+
+ 12!
ua
a+
: Taking the rst order derivative of E [] with regard to , we have
1
2!
a
(a+)
q
au

a+
+ !ma
q
au

a+
> 0: Thus E [] increases in ; or decreases in
1

:
24
C Proof of Corollary 1.2:
When insider trading is allowed, the expected rm prot is
E [V ] = E (E [bq] (ea  E [bq]))
=
1
16!2
 
4!2

E

aes+ ma
a + 
2
  ua
a + 
!
=
1
16!2

4!2m2a  
ua
a + 

: (36)
Examining the relation between expected rm prot and the managers current stake in the rm, we
have @@! (E [V ]) =
1
8!3
q
ua
a+
> 0; indicating E [V ] increases in !: Examining the relation between
expected rm prot and , we have @@ (E [V ]) =  
1
16!2
2a
u
(a+)
2 < 0; indicating E [V ] decreases
in , or increases in accounting precision 1 :
D Proof of Proposition 2:
In the second stage, manager 1 and the market maker 1 use linear strategies d1 (V1) = 1 + 1 eV1
and P1
ed1 + eu = 1 + 1 ed1 + eu : Manager i determines di so as to maximize his trading prot
E
heV1   1   1 ed1 + eu d1jeV1 = V1i = (V1   1   1d1) d1: Taking the rst order condition w.r.t
d1 and setting it equal to zero, we get 1 =
 1
21
and 1 =
1
21
:
Based on s1 and s2; the updated market demand is (ajs1; s2)  N

ma+a(s1+s2)
2a+
; a2a+

.
The corresponding nal rm value is thus eV1  N bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) ; bq21 a2a+ : Since eD1 =
1 + 1
eV1 + eu ; we have eD1  N 1 + 1bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) ; 21bq21 a2a+ + u : We also
know that eV1 and eD1 are bivariate normal with eV1eD1
!
 N2
" bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2)
1 + 1bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) ; bq
2
1
a
2a+
1bq21 a2a+
1bq21 a2a+ 21bq21 a2a+ + u
#
:
Market maker 1 thus decides that 1 =
1bq21 a2a+
21bq21 a2a+ +u and 1 = bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2)
  1bq21 a2a+
21bq21 a2a+ +u (1 + 1bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2)) : Solving for the unknowns, we have
1 =  
p
uq
a
a+
(E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) , 1 = pubq1q a2a+
1 = bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) ; 1 = 12 bq1u
r
ua
2a + 
:
The price for rm 1s share is therefore
P1 (D1) =
1
2
bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) + 1
2
bq1 (ea  bq1   bq2) + 1
2u
bq1r ua
2a + 
eu; (37)
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and manager 1s trading prot conditional on not knowing V1 is E
heV1   eP1 d1i = bq12 qua2a+ :
In the rst stage, manager 1 decides his production quantity bq1 so as to maximize his total
payo¤ !E
heV1i + E [1] = !bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) + bq12 qua2a+ . Taking the rst order con-
dition with regard to bq1 and setting it equal to zero, we have bq1 = 2!(E[ajs1;s2] bq2)+
r
ua
2a+
4! :
The problem facing manager 2 and market maker 2 is identical. Applying symmetry, we havebq1 = bq2 = 16! 2!E [ajs1; s2] +qua2a+  :
E Proof of Corollary 2.1:
Substituting the solutions from Proposition 2, we know the manager is expected trading prot
E [i] is
E
heVi   ePi dii = E [bqi]
2
r
ua
2a + 
=
1
12!
ua
2a + 
+
1
6
E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 
r
ua
2a + 
=
1
12!
ua
2a + 
+
ma
6
r
ua
2a + 
: (38)
Computing @@E [i], we have
1
6!
a

!ma+
r
au

2a+
2a+
q
au

2a+
> 0:
F Proof of Corollary 2.2:
Given the solutions in Proposition 2, the expected rm value when insider trading is allowed is
E
heVii = E [E [bqi] (ea  E [bqi]  E [bqj ])]
=
1
6!
 
2!E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 

+
r
ua
2a + 
!
 
E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 

  2
 
1
6!
 
2!E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 

+
r
ua
2a + 
!!!
=
1
6!
 
2!ma +
r
ua
2a + 
! 
ma  
 
1
3!
 
2!ma +
r
ua
2a + 
!!!
: (39)
Further, taking the rst order derivative of E [Vi] when insider trading is allowed, we have
2au+(2!ama+!ma)
r
au

2a+
18!3(2a+)
> 0: Again, we see the expected rm value increases in the
managers stake in the rm. Taking the rst order derivative of E [i] with regard to , we have
  1
18!2
a

!ma+2
r
au

2a+
2a+
q
au

2a+
< 0; implying the expected rm value increases in the
accounting precision 1 .
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G Proof of Proposition 3:
Let d11
eV1 = 11 +11 eV1 be the demand manager 1 submits for rm 1s shares; and d12 eV1 =
12 +12 eV1 be the demand manager 1 submits for rm 2s shares. Let d22 eV2 = 22 +22 eV2 be the
demand manager 2 submits for rm 2s shares, and d21
eV2 = 21 +21 eV2 be the demand manager 2
submits for rm 1s shares. Market maker 1 sets the linear pricing strategy p1
ed11 + ed21 + eu1 = 1+
1
ed11 + ed21 + eu1 ; and market maker 2 sets the strategy p2 ed22 + ed12 + eu2 = 2+2 ed22 + ed12 + eu2 :
Manager 1 maximizes his trading prots from both rm 1s shares and rm 2s shares
E
heV1   ep1 d11jeV1 = V1i+ E hE heV2i  ep2 d12jeV1 = V1i : (40)
Since the production quantities are public information, and both managers observe the realized
common market demand ea = a, the two managers know each others rm values perfectly. That is,
manager 1s objective function is
max
d11;d12
E
heV1   ep1 d11jeV1 = V1i+ E heV2   ep2 d12jeV2 = V2i
= (V1   1   1 (d11 + d21)) d11 + (V2   2   2 (d12 + d22)) d12 (41)
Taking the rst order condition with regard to d11 and d12 we have eV1 1 21d11 1d21 = 0;
and eV2   2   22d12   2d22 = 0:
Manager 2s problem is symmetric to manager 1s. Thus we know
d11 =   1
21

 eV1 + 1 + 1d21 ; d12 =   122

 eV2 + 2 + 2d22 ;
d22 =   1
22

 eV2 + 2 + 2d12 ; d21 =   121

 eV1 + 1 + 1d11 ;
which is equivalent to
11 = 21 =
 1
31
; 11 = 21 =
1
31
;
12 = 22 =
 2
32
; 12 = 22 =
1
32
:
We know that market maker 1s strategy is
P1
 eD1 = 1 + 1 11 + 11 eV1 + 21 + 21 eV2 + eu1 : (42)
Again eV1 and eD1 are bivariate normally distributed with means bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) and 11 +
11bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) + 21 + 21bq2 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) ; respectively. Their var-cov matrix
is " bq21 a2a+ 11bq21 a2a+
11bq21 a2a+  211bq21 + 221bq22 a2a+ + u
#
:
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Thus, we have
1 =
11bq21 a2a+ 
211bq21 + 221bq22 a2a+ + u , 1 = E
heV1i  1E h eD1i ;
2 =
22bq22 a2a+ 
22bq22 + 212bq21 a2a+ + u ; 2 = E
heV2i  2E h eD2i :
Solving for all the unknowns, we get
11 =   1p
2bq21 bq22
p
ur
a
2a+
(2bq1   bq2) (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) ;
12 =   1p
2bq22 bq21
p
ur
a
2a+
(2bq1   bq1) (E [ajs1; s2]  bq2   bq1) ;
11 =
1p
2bq21 bq22
p
u
a
2a+
; 12 =
1p
2bq22 bq21
p
u
a
2a+
;
1 = (2bq1   bq2) (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) ; 1 = p2bq21 bq223
r
a
2a+p
u
:
For manager 2 and market maker 2, the solutions are symmetric. Substituting the solutions into
manager 1s total trading prot E [(V1   1   1 (d11 + d21)) d11] +E [(V2   2   2 (d12 + d22)) d12],
conditional on manager 1 does not know the nal value of a, we know his total expected trading
prot is
E
24 1
3
p
2bq21   bq22
p
uq
a
2a+
eV1   (2V1   V2)2
35+ E
24 1
3
q
2bq22   bq12
p
uq
a
2a+
eV1   (2V2   V1)2
35
=
bq21qua2a+
3
p
2bq21   bq22 +
bq22qua2a+
3
p
2bq22   bq21 : (43)
Manager 1 thus maximizes his total payo¤ by choosing quantity bq1:
maxbq1 ! (bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2)) + bq
2
1
q
ua
2a+
3
p
2bq21   bq22 +
bq22qua2a+
3
p
2bq22   bq21 (44)
Taking the rst order condition with regard to bq1 and setting it equal to zero, we have
! (E [ajs1; s2]  2bq1   bq2) + 1
3
r
ua
2a + 
0@2bq1  bq21   bq22 
2bq21   bq22 32 +
bq1bq22 
2bq22   bq21 32
1A = 0: (45)
Manager 2s problem is symmetric. Applying symmetry and solving for bq1 = bq2; we get bq1 = bq2 =
1
9!

3!E [ajs1; s2] +
q
ua
2a+

:
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H Proof of Corollary 3.1:
Substituting the solutions from Proposition 3, we know the manager is expected trading prot
E [i] is
E [i] =
E [bq]
3
r
ua
2a + 
=
u
27!
a
2a + 
+
1
9
E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 
r
ua
2a + 
=
u
27!
a
2a + 
+
ma
9
r
ua
2a + 
(46)
Computing @@E [i], we have
1
9!
a

!ma+
r
au

2a+
2a+
q
au

2a+
> 0:
I Proof of Corollary 3.2:
The expected rm value when insider trading is allowed and the managers trade in both own and
rival rmsstocks is
E
heVii = E [E [bqi] (ea  E [bqi]  E [bqj ])]
=
1
9!
 
3!E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 

+
r
ua
2a + 
!
 
E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 

  2
 
1
9!
 
3!E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 

+
r
ua
2a + 
!!!
=
1
9!
 
3!ma +
r
ua
2a + 
! 
ma  
 
2
9!
 
3!ma +
r
ua
2a + 
!!!
: (47)
Taking the rst order derivative of E [Vi] w.r.t. !i, we have

4au+(6!a+3!)ma
r
au

2a+

81!3(2a+)
> 0: Again, we see the expected rm value increases in the managers stake in the rm. Taking rst
order derivative of E [Vi] with regard to , we have   181!2 a
3!ma+4
r
au

2a+
2a+
q
au

2a+
< 0; implying that E [Vi] increases in accounting precision 1 :
J Proof of Proposition 4
Again, we use backward induction to nd the solution.
In the second stage, manager 1 and the market maker 1 use linear strategies d1 (V2) = 1 + 1 eV2
and P2
ed1 + eu = 2 + 2 ed1 + eu : Manager 1 determines d12 by maximizing his trading prot
max
d12
E
heV2   2   2 ed12 + eu d12jeV2 = V2i
= (V2   2   2d12) d12: (48)
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Taking the rst order condition w.r.t d12 and setting it equal to zero, we get 12 =
 2
22
and 12 =
1
22
:
Based on s1 and s2; the updated market demand is (ajs1; s2)  N

E [ajs1; s2] ; a2a+

. The
corresponding nal rm value is thus eV2  N bq2 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) ; bq22 a2a+ : Since eD1 =
12 +12 eV2 +eu; we know eD1  N 12 + 12bq2 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) ; 212bq22 a2a+ + u :We also
know that eV2 and eD1 are bivariate normal with eV2eD1
!
 N2
" bq2 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2)
12 + 12bq2 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) ; bq
2
2
a
2a+
12bq22 a2a+
12bq22 a2a+ 212bq22 a2a+ + u
#
:
Market maker 1 thus decides that 2 =
12bq22 a2a+
212bq22 a2a+ +u and 2 = bq2 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2)
  12bq22 a2a+
212bq22 a2a+ +u (12 + 12bq2 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2)) :Solving for the unknowns, we have
12 =  
p
uq
a
2a+
(E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) ; 12 = pubq2q a2a+
2 = bq2 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) ; 2 = 12 bq2pu
r
a
2a + 
:
The price for rm 2s share is therefore P2
ed12 + eu = 2 + 2 ed12 + eu, with
P2 (D1) =
1
2
bq2 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) + 1
2
bq2 (ea  bq1   bq2) + 1
2u
bq2ru a
2a + 
eu; (49)
and manager 1s trading prot conditional on not knowing V2 is
E
heV2   eP2 d12i = bq2
2
r
u
a
2a + 
: (50)
In the rst stage, manager 1 decides his production quantity bq1 by maximizing his total payo¤.
His problem is:
maxbq1 !E
heV1i+ E [1]
= !bq1 (E [ajs1; s2]  bq1   bq2) + bq2
2
r
u
a
2a + 
(51)
Manager 2s problem is symmetric. Applying symmetry and solving for the production quantity, we
have bq1 = bq2 = 13E [ajs1; s2] :
K Proof of Corollary 4.1
Knowing bqi = bqj = 13E [ajsi; sj ], we can compute manager is ex-ante expected insider trading
prot
E
heii = E heVj   ePj diji = E [bqi]
2
r
ua
2a + 
=
ma
6
r
ua
2a + 
; (52)
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and the expected rm value of rm i is
E
heVii = 1
9

E

ma + a (esi + esj)
2a + 
2
=
m2a
9
: (53)
L Proof of Proposition 5:
The boards program is:
max
;!
E [V   (+ !V )] (54)
subject to individual rationality (IR) condition
E [] + + !E [V ]  0: (55)
Plugging the binding IR condition into the boards objective function, it simplies to max
!
E [V ] +
E [] : We then substitute E [V ] and E [] into the boards objective function, and get
max
!
1
16!2

4!2m2a  
ua
a + 

+ma
r
ua
a + 
+
1
2!
ua
a + 
: (56)
Taking the rst order condition w.r.t. !, we have 1
8!3
(1  4!) uaa+ . Setting it to equal zero and
solving for !, we get ! = 14 :
In our model, the optimal ! is a constant because of the stylized setting. The parameters simply
drop out due to the linear demand functions in both the product and nancial market. Checking for
second order condition, we take the second order derivative w.r.t. ! and get 1
8!4
(8!   3) uaa+ ;
which is negative when ! = 14 . Thus we know the second order condition is satised.
M Proof of Proposition 6:
The program of rm is boards is:
max
i;!i
E [Vi   (i + !iVi)] (57)
subject to individual rationality (IR) condition
E [i] + i + !iE [Vi]  0: (58)
Substituting the binding IR condition into the boards objective function, it becomes max
!i
E [Vi] +
E [i] : Then we substitute E [Vi] and E [i] into the boards objective function, and get
max
!i
1
12!i
ua
2a + 
+
ma
6
r
ua
2a + 
+
1
6!i
 
2!ima +
r
ua
2a + 
! 
ma  
 
1
3!i
 
2!ima +
r
ua
2a + 
!!!
(59)
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Taking the FOC w.r.t. !i, we get 136!3i

(4  3!i) ua2a+ + 2!ima
q
ua
2a+

. Setting it to equal
zero and solving for !i, we get !i =
4
ua
2a+
3
ua
2a+
 2ma
r
ua
2a+
: The numerator 4ua2a+ is larger than
the denominator 3ua2a+   2ma
q
ua
2a+
, so !i > 1 has to be true. Since !

i must fall in the range
of [0; 1], we know !i = 1 is the only viable solution. Checking for second order condition, we take
the second order derivative w.r.t. ! and get   1
18!4i

(6  3!i) ua2a+ + 2ma!i
q
ua
2a+

, which is
negative when 0  !i  1. Thus we know the second order condition is satised.
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